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The writer of the present article is interested in the Fo口nosan 
issue of today Today, the Formosan issue is, as is often said, a 
principle matter for the Chmese Communist Party in its foreign 
policy. In connection with the Forrrios閉店sue,The R』・ople’sDaily 
News stated that it was impossible to talk over the principle with 
the Chinese people." Therefore, there is a view on this matter to 
the effect that the Chinese stubborn attitude toward Formosa will 
:Jast for a long time to come.町 However,there has been no work 
.aralyzing the reasons why the Chmese Communists consider the 
Formosan issue was a problem of fundamental importance for China. 
A tough volume of The History of Formosa in International Politics 
by Dr. Teh Tehn・chiau of Hosei University, for instance, completely 
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lacks analysis on the Chmese Communists' attitude toward Fo口nosa町
Though there are many essays and articles touched upon the 
Formosan issue, only the impressions are told in those works. 
Unsatisfied with these works, the writer makes a bnef study on 
the historical background of today’S Formosan issue. To understand 
the whole meaning of the Formosan issue, it seems to be necessary 
to consider the matter with the problem of the mmority groups In 
the 1940、theChinese Communist Party seems to have changed 
its attitude toward Formosa from “support. for independence" to“a 
province of China" without any explanation. In the s田nepenod, 
the Chinese Commumst Party also altered its future goal from 
formation・ of a federation of states in China to a smgle state as we 
see “People’s Republic of China" of today. It is a question, if there 
was any co四百ctionbetween this policy change and the alteration of 
Formosan policy. 
This 盟国 attemptat a consistent understanding of the Chmese 
Communists' attitude toward Formosa, connecting the Formosan 
issue and the problem of the minority groups. Before making an 
analysis from this point of view, it might be nec田saryto touch 
upon the premises and the analytical framework of this brief study. 
It is often said that China’s foreign policy is based on Mao Tse・ 
tung’s Thought, which is an applied form of the Marx・ Leninism to 
China. While the decision makers of China cosider themselves as 
Marx・ Lenimsts and employ Mao Tse・tung’s Thought as their prin・ 
ciple of behavior, it is obvious that such M田logiesinfluence China’s 
foreign pohcy greatly However, neither the. Marx-Leninism nor 
Mao’s Thought is fundamentally a principle applied for foreign policy; 
1〕 ThePeople’s D出ilyN削 s,February 19, 1964. Editorial. 
2) Shinkichi Eta and Tatsumi Okabe, "People’s Republic of China : 
Principle of Foreign Policy Conduct" m their China帥 tlzeWorld （$嗣i
no加知加 Chugoku),Tokyo 1969. p. 104-107. 
3) Teh Tehn.cbiau, The History of Formosa出 In抑制tionalPolitics(Tat-
wan Kokusai Sei,..sh1 Kenkyu〕， Tokyo1971 
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therefore, the dec1s1on makers seem to have more operat1onal prin-
ciples of foreign policy, which are the actual guides of policy, based 
on concrete necessity, concrete environment, concrete problems etc 
The so -called “operational ideology叫》isrooted m the Marx-Leni-
nism and Mao Tse-tung’s Thought, or the doctrinal ideology, but is 
“ope四tionalizedby taking into account the specific national, historical 
and psychological conditions町 ofChina. Between the doctrinal d田・
logy and the operational ide日ology,usually there is difference，田d
the two ideologies may conflict each other sometime. Conflict between 
the two ideolog虫色 it回 nbe said, usually dissolved by preferring 
the operational ideology, smce 1t is based on concrete necessity.町
Then, it is the question when the decision makers dissolve such 
a conflict The writer assumes that the decision makers do not 
recognize the discrepancy and conflict between the doctrinal ideology 
until they may face the concrete problem If the matter 1s not urgent 
for them, the decision makers seem to consider it only in an abst四ct
sense. Only when the decision makers consider that the matter is 
urgent for them, the conflict comes into the mind. The more 
important a problem may be, the bigger conflict of the two ideolo-
g1es 1s. 
The Chinese Commumst Party seems to have formed its funda-
mental image of international politics m the 1940’s, while the 
Chinese Communists Party was on the rise at that time, and was 
gaining power m China, fighting agaist the Nationalist Government. 
Mao Tse-tung’s article “On C田.ht10nGovernment，”for instance, was 
issued in this period Therefore, the writer assumes that both 
Formosan issue and the・ minority problem were for the Chinese 
4) See Tatsumi Okabe，“Problems in the Study of Sino-Soviet Conflict” 
in The journal of Soc；悶lScience, No 5, ICU. September 1964. p. 201-
230 And also his Foreign Policy of Contemporary China (Gendai Chugoku 
7悶 TazgaiSeisaku〕， Tokyo1971. 
5) Ibid，“Problems", p 222 
6〕 Tatsum1Okabe, "China’S Image of International Politics＇’in International 
Affairs (Kokusai M仰向。， No.149. August 1972 pp 38-51. 
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Communists those ansen m the process of nation building in China 
][ 
On April 15, 1928, the Formosan Communist Party was established 
“under direct mfluence and support of the Chinese Communist 
Party，” though 1t was named 'The Formosan Nation Branch of the 
Japanese Communist Party' because of Formosan s1tuat10n w1tbm 
Japan’s pohtical -economic system.'' 
According to the documents of the then Formosan Governor’s 
Office, Pohce Department, there was another communist organisation 
named 'The Formosan Nat10n Branch of the Chinese Communist 
Party', which was estabhshed on October 18, 1928 This organizat10n 
was, however, under direct10n of some leading members of the 
Formosan Nat10n Branch of the Japanese communist Party.町 Since
the branch of the Chinese Communist Party did not have any direct 
relation with the Chinese Communists.・itis even doubtful whether 
the Chinese Communists knew of its existence.…， hereafter, the 
so－回liedFormosan Communist Party, the branch of the Japanese 
Communist Party is treated.'' 
Acceptmg the mstructrnns from the Communist International, 
Formosan members of the Chinese Communist Party, Lm Mu-chun 
and Hsien Hsueh hung returned at the end of 1927 to Shanghai from 
Moscow, where they had studied. In the Th目指 of1927，“complete 
independence of the colony" and instructions of communist movements 
to both Korea and Formosa was determined as an important role of 
the Japanese Communist Party. Therefore, both Lin and Hsieh went to 
Tokyo one after the other to receive directions from the Japanese 
Communist Party. The two Foロnosancommunists went back to 
7) Chang Yu, ed , Our Fom悶担（陥omen.leTaiuan〕，Shanghai,1955 p 85 
8〕“A古田tingdetails of Tokyo Special Branch Members of Japan c。
mmunist Party Formosan Nation Branch", m Kentaro Yamabe ed., 
Current History Materials . Forn日sa(Gendai.shi Shiryo: y，出動四）， Vol. 
2. p. 90. Also, see unidentified wnter's“Principle of Party Organization 
in Formosa and its Condit即時” mthe目mevolume. p 273. 
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Shanghai m February, 1928, with theses of organization and of 
policy issued from the Cen仕alCommitte of the Japanese Communist 
Party. In this organizational thesis, it was wntten that the Formosan 
Communist Party should be a branch of the Japanese Communist 
Party for an adequate period, and also there were instructions to 
secure support from the Chinese Communist Party in the construt10n 
-of the Formosan Communist Party.＇町
Following this course, Lm and Hsieh held a meeting called “Active 
Elements Conference of the Formosan Commuists”on Aprill 13, 1928. 
At the conference, there were eleven in attendance, mcluding a 
representative of the Chinese Commumst Party, and they determined 
to have a“Construction Conference ”＇＂ 
The Chinese representative was recorded under the name of “P’eng 
Ying，＇’ a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
:mst Party."> 
The Active Elements Conference is said to have been convened 
to settle the preparation for the construction of the party 
On April 15, in the French Settlement of Shanghai, the Construction 
•Conference of the Formosan Communist Party was held At the 
Conference, P’eng made a bnef speech quoting the history of the 
・Chmese Communist Party ＂》 Then,the nine in attendance, including 
P'eng and a representative of the Korean communists, discussed the 
principles of Policy, Organization, as well as those of the labour 
刀10vement,farmer's problems, yourth affairs, international affairs 
.etc. Those discussion were under P’eng’s direction. Lin Mu-chun 
was elected the Secretary General. Among 13 slogans written in the 
:Principle of Pohcy, we see, 
“2 Cheer for Formoson People’s Independence, 
3. Uphold the Construction of the Repubhc of Formosa ”＂＇ 
9) Ibid., p. 90. 
10) Nation/ Moiement undeγ］a抑制seRule, Vol. 2 'Pohtical Movement九
Tokyo, 1969. p. 589-595 "Arresting D世田ls’＂， op Cit p. 84-86. 
11）“Political Movement"' op. cit pp 589 595. 
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There is a dispute on the interpretation of the above slogans as to 
whether or not the Formosan Communist Party ms1sted upon 
independence be氾auseof its aversion to reactionary China under 
Chiang Ka1-shek. Dr Koh Se-kai, Assistant Professor of Tsudaiuku 
University, evaluates the clear announcement of ”Uphold the Con-
struct10n of the Republic of Formosa”in his work, Japan’s Colonial 
Policy and the Taiwanese Resistance Movement.向 Mr.Ken tam 
Yomabe, the editor of Current HistoηMaterials: Foγmosa, contrary 
to this mterpretation, says that the term“independence”means. 
the separat10n from imperialistic rule, and that the Formosan 
Communist Party opposed return to China under the reactionary 
regime of Chiang Kai shek.1" 
The dispute 1s made around the aims of the Formosan Commum-
sts The problem, however, concerns the reason why the Chinese 
Communist Party approved such slogans, or the principles, smce・ 
those were written under direct influence and assistance of the・ 
Chinese Communist Party, as well as the establishment of the・ 
Formosan Commumst Party itself. The prmc1ple, we may say, 
reflected the Chmese Commumsts' view toward the island of 
Formosa and its p田ple.
The Chmese Commumst Party considered the Formosan JSsue not 
a domestic affair but that of foreign policy, reflecting the history 
12) Ibid. 
Though Prof. Koh Se ka1 identified this represenative as F’eng P’ai,. 
then member of the Central Committee and well known leader of the 
Farmers' movement, it is stil obscure It is unknown when P’enir 
P'a1 went mto Shanghai, escaped from the collapsed Hailufeng Soviet. 
See H1deo Yamamoto，“F’eng P’a1 and Farmers Movement" m Asian 
Economics (Ajia keizai），区一12,December 1968 pp. 100-117. And 
Shmkichi Eta, "The History of世ieHailufeng Soviet”in his The Political 
History of五回tAsia，〔HigashiAjia Seiji-shi Kenkyu), Tokyo, 1968. 
13) Ministry of Internal A百airs,Dep. of Security, •’Arresting the Fermo-
田nCommunist Party”， resume m Current History, op. cit pp 245-253. 
14) lbι，and Nat叩畑lM即e附ent,op cit. pp. 595-657 
15) Koh Se-kai, Japan’s CりlomalPoliり andthe Taiuanese Resistance 
Movement (Nippon Tochi 
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<Jf Formosa as a colony of China in the past目 SmeeFormo田 under
Ch ma’s rule befo町 itscession to Japan was a sort of colony, the 
Chmese Communist leaders, who devoted themselves to the antト
imperiahsm struggle, considered the matter as an independence 
movement of the Formosans against Japanese imperialism. Up until 
mrly 1940’s, the Chinese Communist Party did not assert the “目covery 
<Jf Formosa”， but declared its support for the “Formosans’indepen-
dence movement”m its foreigo pohcy. Even when the Chinese 
Communist Party instructed the Formosan Communists in the 
reformation of their party and reconsideration of the po!ic1es, 
rev1s1on of the prmciple was not mcluded町
][ 
The Chmese Communise Party denied its right of speech on the 
Formosan issue, because they considered that the island had been 
colony of the late Ching Dynasty and the Chinese Communists 
msisted on the people’s hberatlon. At the first stage of the Chma 
war, Liu Shao-chi, then leader of the hberated目前， treatedthe 
problems of Korea and Formosa w1thm foreign pohcy; only if, he 
wrote, as they hoped, support should be given to the mdependence 
movement of the Korean and Formosan peoples.山
At the sixth plenum of the sixth term Central Committee in 1938, 
Mao Tse-tung made a speech, lately known as “α1 the New Stageぺ
Though this speech is not enclosed in the present“Selected Works 
<Jf Mao Tse-tung”， it was widely spread even in the area under the 
Kuomintang (the Nationahst Government〕ruleat that time目 Inthis 
16) Ctげ何ntHis白ry,op. cit , Exposition, p. xxvi. 
Obviously, there must have been a dispute among the Formosan 
Commumsts as to whether or not belong to the Japanese Communist 
Party. See, Ong Jok-tik, Taiwan, Tokyo 1970.〔Newedition) p 127. 
17) Chu Chiu-pa1, then member of the Central Committee, got in touch 
with the Formosan Communists in Shanghai National Movement, op. 
cit., pp 67 4・ 676 
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speech, Mao disclosed the prmciple of the anti-Japanese united front, 
cooperating with suppressed peoples hke the Koreans and the 
Formosans.出
“The war of invasion of Japanese imperialism does not 
only endanger the Chinese nation but also harms al the 
Japanese soldiers and people, and suppressed peoples like 
Koreans and Formosans, therefore, to make the Japanese 
fail m the mvading war, 1t 1s inevitable to have wide and 
口Jmmonefforts among soldiers and peoples of the two great 
nat10ns of China and Japan and suppressed peoples like 
Koreans and Formosans, and to construct a common umted 
front of anti -invasion”＂＇ 
Based on Mao’s proposal, the Formosan people were categorized 
apart from each Chinese nation, Mongohans, Tibetans, etc in a 
decision of the sixth meeting.'" The “Liberation of Fo口nosa”was 
not included anywhere m the strategic goals of the Chinese Comm-
uni st Party. The r田町nwhy not is explained by Mao clearly In a 
dialogue with Edgar Snow, Mao said，“（Speaking of recovery of lost 
territories,) we do not, however, mclude Korea, formerly a Chinese 
colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the 
lost territories of Chma, and 1f the Koreans wish to break away 
from the chains of Japanese 1mperiahsm, we will extend to them 
our enthusiastic help m their struggle for mdependence. The same 
thing apphes for Taiwan〔Formoa）目叫＂
They do not include Formosa m the range of recovery of lost 
terntones, giving as a reason, the fact that it was formerly a 
Chmese colony. This statement is very important m a sense that it 
18) Se1ji Imahori，‘＇Nationalism and Class Struggle血 theYenan Regime，’ 
in AsiaタzEe,仰＜Omt回 （Aj叫 Keizat〕， XI一6.PP 19 却
19) There a阻 somedifferent texts of the ‘On the New StageぺPresent
“Selected Works of Mao Tse tung”only encloses the seventh chapter 
in revised form目 SeeCollected Wnrks of Mao Tse-tung, Hokubo sha edi-
tion, Vol 6. Also se, lmahori, Ibid., pp 6ー7
20) Collected Works, Ibid 
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is the only reference to clarify a ground for the independence 
Until 1943，七omsist on the occupation of Formosa in the Cairo 
Declaration and m Mao’s“On Coahtion Government"(l945), the pos1t10n 
was not altered. Only after 1945, the Chmese Commumst Party 
began to appeal for the liberation of Formosa, msmtmg that the 
Formosan problem 1s a domestic affair of Chma, under a fundame・ 
ntal alterョtionof the policy toward Formosa. Therefore, it is田1
unacceptable in匝rp回tation,as Edgar Snow noted later to the above・ 
mentioned Mao's s也t田n田市加 say吋tseems hardly likely that 
Mao intended to concede future 'independence’there.叫 S》
Then what国 usedthe fundamental alteration of the Formosan 
policy of the Chinese Communist Party? This question will be 
discussed in the next sect10n. 
N 
In the 1940’s, the Chmese Communist Party made another imp・ 
ortant change in its policy ; that is of a goal of the state fo口nation
in the future, from “a fede四tionof states”to“a unified single 
state”. The writer’s question 1s 1f there is any relat10n between 
this pohcy alteration and that of the Formosan policy. An interpre・ 
tation made below, connecting these two problems, is only an at・ 
tempt at a consistent understanding of China’s policy toward For・ 
江田sa
In May, 1922, the Second National Conference of the Chmese 
Commumst Party issued a declaration on its duties and goals In 
this declaration, the future goal of the s組teformation was clari ・ 
fied; 
“to construct the Federal Republic of China, unifymg the 
21〕 Imahori,op. cit., p. 20 
2〕 EdgarSnow, Red Star Over Clm拙 London1937, London 1972 enlarged 
ed p. 128 
23〕 lbiι，p480. 
Snow’s interpretation is similar to that of Prof Imahori on the m1-
nority problem, in his Introductory Study of Mao Tse.lung's Thought, 
“Mmoriry Groups Policyぺ
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Chmese mamland, Mongo!Ja, Tibet, and Turk1stan in a 
system of free fede阻むon”＂》
It is quite different from the single multi -racial nation of today, 
at least m a system of free fede四tionthat was definitely expressed 
in the draft. 
During the China War,Lm Shao-chi wrote a remarkable article 
m which he extended concrete palic1es ta construct a liberated zone. 
In mmority races palicy, Liu admitted not only minorities' nght of 
lacal autonomy but also the right of separation and independence, 
and guaranteed their freedam of armaments, and the right of・ the 
development of each group’s own culture and religion "' Such a 
mmority pahcy should be considered as a mechanical copy of Soviet 
Russia’s policy＂》
In this situation, the Chinese Communist Party established a 
single state in 1949. This complete alteration of state format10n 1s, 
according to Prof. Seiji Imahon of Hiroshima Umve四1ty,a fruit 
of the sophistication of their nationalism, since in the Yenan regime 
the problem was considered lacking class analy•is m their artless 
nationalism."' 
Though Prof. Iniahon says that the Chinese Communist m the 
period of the Yenan regime had a position of bourgeois nationahsm, 
the minority policy should be considered as a mechanical copy of 
policies m U.S. S. R., as has been mentioned. Otherwise, it is 
contradictory enough, when he says the Chinese Cammumsts’For-
即asanpohcy clashed with the assert10n af the Nationalist Govern-
24) Japan Institute of International Affa口s,Dep. of Chma, ed. Decnments 
and Materials of the History of the Chinese Commnmst Party, Vol. I, 
Document No 32 esp pp 141-142. 
Also, Gen'1chi Suzue, The Ristoり ofthe Chinese L必erationStruggle 
(Chugoku Kaiho Toso.shi〕， IshizakiShoten, p 95 
25〕 Imah on，“Yenan Regime’＇， op. cit., PP 4-5 
The original versrnn of Mao’s "On Coalition Government ’kept the 
same policy, though the present ve四ionm his“Selected Works" is 
revised. See Coll，町tedDocuments of _New China, Japan Institute of In-
ternatlonal Affairs, Vol. 1 
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ment of the domination of Formosa based on bourge01s national -
lS立1
The matter is truly one of nationalism. However, it is not 
persuasive enough, only to speak of the change from “bourgeois 
nationahsm”to“proletarian nat10nal!sm”. lsn’t the change caused 
m the nation bmldmg process of China 7 The writer should like to 
explain the problem from this view-point 
Liu’s above-mentioned opinion on mmority races 1s quite similar 
to that of Mao on “the pro blem of an mtemational union of soviets’L 
In the words Mao Tse-tung as 回 idto Edgar Snow on July 23, 
1936, we see that his op1mon 1s that“such a world umon could be 
successful only if every nation had the right to enter or leave the 
union accordmg to the will of its people, and with its sovereignty 
mtact, and certamly never at the ‘command’of Moscow.”＂＇ 
Mao’s statement gives support to, as a matter of fact, the alliance 
of the sovereign states within a nat10n-state system Accordmg to 
Prof. Tatsumi Okabe of Tokyo Metropolitan University, China’S 
image of international politics is unique in the sense that mainte-
nance or protect10n of a nation-state system is China’s natural prem -
ise.'" It was a most important goal for the Chmese Commumsts 
to establish a“umfied and rich new state of China”， smce Chma 
had been suppressed and invaded by 'imperiahsm’for a long time. 
Therefore, the leaders of the Chmese Communist Party have ada-
pted “equality and reciprocity, mutual respect of territorial sover-
eignty”as a basis of its foreign policy from the start of People’s 
Repubhc of Chma. '" 
The rights of minority races within China, admitted in the past 
policy as m Liu's article, may weaken “a unified, nch new state 
26) Koretada Sakamoto, Minority Groups Problem酎zdFrontier Districtsげ
China 〔ChugokuHenkyo 白 SI•日su Min却•ku i>Iond.田！）, Institute of Asian 
Economics, 1970. p. 16-17. 
27) lmahon，“Yenan Regime", op cit., pp. 20晶30.
28) Stuart Schram, Tlze Po/itzcal Tlzouglzt of Mao Tse-tung, Middlesex, 
1969 p. 419. 
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of China" In other words, such a policy was based on cons1dera-
tion that language, culture, kinship, etc. were mo問 import加 t
rather than adiacency, and mterests of economic hfe and security. 
The policy alteration was, we may say, made in the period that 
the Chinese Communist Party had to make efforts in construction 
of a new statP based on its vis10n, gaining power in China田山
Then what caused the time lag of policy alteration in the !Ssues 
of Fo口nosaand the minority groups? Hypothetically, the wnter 
understands that the Chinese Communists decided the policy alte四・
tlon of the Formosan issue facing the concrete problem 〔theCairo 
Declaration), but they did not realize that it should be followed by 
an alteration of the minority policy. 
Although the Chinese Com.mumsts aimed Socialism based on a 
mternat10nahstic v1s1on, they had to follow the problem withm the 
frame of a state. Therefore, the so-called “Theory of State”must 
be considered mstead of the so-called “Theory of Revolution，＇’ or 
additionally. The Chinese Communist Party made a choice realis-
tically, putting off the theoretical justification目
29) Okabe, 
30) Ibid. 
Chinese accusation on the Soviet Russian theory of“limited sovereignty” 
in 19唱8,after the Czechoslovakian Incident, denied Lenin's Thesis of 
“bourgeois nationalism”， saymg the sovereignty shall never be limited 
by any powers Prof. Imaho口’Sinterpretation is not applicable to this 
accusation See, Lenin，“Draft of Thesis on the Problems of Nation 
and Colomes”in The Collected Works of Lenin, (Japanese edition〕Vol.
31 pp 139-143. 
31) Prof Okabe argues the Overseas Chinese problem from the same 
paint of view. See, Tosh10 Kawabe ed , Ove1seas Chinese in South E出t
Asia, Institute of Asian Economics 1972 Chapter II. 
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「中国共産党の台湾に対する態度」
一一「台湾独立」から「台湾解放」へ一一
＜抄＞
森山昭郎
今日，台湾問題は中国にとって原則的重要性を持つ問題だと言われる。
たしかに，中国自身，繰り返しそう主張している。このような，中園の強
い態度については，後にいくつもの説明が加えられている。それらの主張
を要約すれば， 「台湾は中国固有の領土であり，まづ日本帝国主義がこれ
を奪い，次に米帝国主義がこの島を中国から奪ったのであり， 『反帝国主
義闘争』に専心してきた中国共産党指導者にとって，台湾は『帝国主義侵
略』のシγポルとなっている」ということになろう。このような主張自身
が事実と合致するかどうかも議論の対象となりえようが，たとえ事実に合
致しているとしても， 1940年代前半頃までは「台湾独立」支援の発言を行
っていた中共指導者が，それ以後「台湾は中国固有の領土である」と主張
するにいたった理由の説明にはならないであろう。
中国共産党の台湾に対する態度は，もっとも早く，台湾共産党との関連
において知られる。台湾共産党は日本共産党の支部として， 1928年4月に
創設されたが，その際日共は指導，援助する余裕を持たず，かわって中共
が「直接の指導と援助」を与えたといわれる。中共側が台湾共産党のため
に起草したとされる文書中に，「台湾民衆独立万才」「台湾共和国の建設」
などのスローガンが見られる。当時の中共にとって， 「台湾独立」支援は
議論の余地ない当然の態度だったように思われる。
毛沢東は後年，台湾がかつては清国の植民地であったとして，将来にお
いて独立すべきことを説いている（E・スノー『中園の赤い星』）。台湾が
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独立すべき根拠を明確にしたものとしては，この発言がほとんど唯一のも
。と思われるが， 台湾独立支援的態度は1940年代前半まで続き，毛沢東
「連合政府論」 〔1945年4月〉において初めて態度変容が明らかにされた
のである。
この態度変容と，台湾の中国返還を定めたカイロ宣言との聞には重要な
関連があろう。また同じく40年代に，中共は将来の中国における国家形成
の目標を， 「連邦制」というソ連型そデノレから，今日われわれが見る中華
人民共和国型の「単一国家」モデルへと転じている。少数民族の自決権が
否定されることになったわけである。
台湾問題，少数民族問題での中共の態度変容は，自らのずィジョンに基
く新国家建設を目前の課題と見なすにいたった時期になされたと言えよう。
いづれの場合にも，中共指導者は，理論的正当化をしないまま，現実的利
益の観点から「草命の論理」よりも「国家の論理Jを選ぶにいたったよう
である。 〔19何年2月10日〕
